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  • 美国青少年“禁欲教育”失败


    耗资十五亿美元 花费十年时间

    作者:韩曙  日期:2007.04.16  版次:A1-16

        本报专稿  为了避免青少年过早地发生性行为,从1996年起,美国政府开展了一项进行了长达10年时间的“禁欲教育项目”。但美国儿童及家庭管理局进行的一次最新调查报告却显示,这样的性教育,根本起不到任何作用。




    However,nearly 40 years after LaPiere's findings,a review of the attitude-behavīor research that had accumlated over the years concluded that the correlation between measured attitudes and actual behavīor was indeed weak and perhaps nonexistent(Wicker,1971).

    《改变心理学的40项研究 影印版》p292 (美)霍克(Hock,R.R.)中国轻工业出版社 ISBN:7501946124







    Adam Smith

    The Principles of Political Economy and Taxation

    David Recardo            Iron Law of Wages

    The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money

    John Maynard Keynes

    Milton Friedman



  • 原文摘录



    we learn what we are good at, what we really like or dislike, what our tastes and judgments and capacities are”. (p.54)

    Children can’t be pushed ahead. The only way in which we can know is by his choices, which is to say only he can ever really know the right moment when the beckoning forces ahead overbalance the beckoning forces behind, and courage outweighs fear. i.e., The person, even the child, most choose for himself. Nobody can choose for him.” (p.57)

    Only the one who respects fear and defense can teach; only the one who respects health can do therapy.”(p.61)

    pace of growth:

    we can’t force him to grow, we can only coax him to, make it more possible for him, in the trust that simply experiencing the new experience will make him prefer it. Only he can prefer it; no one can prefer it for him.” (p.62)


  • evolutionary psychology


    In the distant future I see open fields for more important researches.Psychology will be based on a new foundation, that of the necessary acquirement of each mental power and capacity by gradation.

    - Charles Darwin, 1859






    Academic Psychiatry; Washington   Full Text  Full Text: 1998 - current
    Academy of Management Journal; Briarcliff Manor   Full Text  Full Text: 1987 - 2001
    Academy of Management. The Academy of Management Review; Briarcliff Manor   Full Text  Full Text: 1987 - 2001
    Addiction; Abingdon   Full Text  Full Text: 1997 - 2000
    The ADHD Report; New York   Full Text  Full Text: 2004 - current
    Administration and Policy in Mental Health; New York   Full Text  Full Text: 1999 - current, delayed 1 year(s)
    Administrative Science Quarterly; Ithaca   Full Text  Full Text: 1987 - 2001
    Adolescence; Roslyn Heights   Full Text  Full Text: 1988 - current
    Adult Education Quarterly; Washington
    AIDS and behavīor; New York   Full Text  Full Text: 1999 - current, delayed 1 year(s)
    AIDS Care; Abingdon   Full Text  Full Text: 1996 - 2000
    AIDS Education and Prevention; New York   Full Text  Full Text: 1998 - current
    Alcohol and Alcoholism : International Journal of the Medical Council on Alcoholism; Oxford   Full Text  Full Text: 1999 - current, delayed 6 month(s)
    Alcohol Research and Health; Washington   Full Text  Full Text: 1990 - current
    Alcoholism; Zagreb   Full Text  Full Text: 2005 - current
    American Annals of the Deaf; Washington   Full Text  Full Text: 1997 - current
    American Anthropologist; Washington   Full Text  Full Text: 1988 - current
    American Educational Research Journal; Washington   Full Text  Full Text: 2001 - current
    American Ethnologist; Arlington
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    American Indian and Alaska Native Mental Health Research (Online); Aurora   Full Text  Full Text: 2000 - current
    American Journal of Clinical Hypnosis; Bloomingdale   Full Text  Full Text: 2003 - current
    American Journal of Community Psychology; New York   Full Text  Full Text: 1994 - current, delayed 1 year(s)
    American Journal of Criminal Justice : AJCJ; Louisville   Full Text  Full Text: 1999 - current
    American Journal of Critical Care; Aliso Viejo   Full Text  Full Text: 1998 - current
    American Journal of Education; Chicago   Full Text  Full Text: 2000 - 2006
    The American Journal of Family Therapy; New York   Full Text  Full Text: 1997 - 2000
    The American Journal of Geriatric Psychiatry; Washington   Full Text  Full Text: 1998 - current
    American Journal of Health behavīor; Star City   Full Text  Full Text: 2003 - current
    The American Journal of Psychiatry; Washington   Full Text  Full Text: 1988 - current
    American Journal of Psychoanalysis; New York   Full Text  Full Text: 1995 - current, delayed 1 year(s)
    The American Journal of Psychology; Urbana   Full Text  Full Text: 1995 - 2001
    American Journal of Psychotherapy; New York   Full Text  Full Text: 1994 - current
    American Journal of Public Health; Washington   Full Text  Full Text: 1992 - current
    The American Journal of Sociology; Chicago   Full Text  Full Text: 1988 - 2006, some exceptions View details
    American Journal of Speech - Language Pathology; Rockville   Full Text  Full Text: 1998 - current
    American Sociological Review; Albany   Full Text  Full Text: 1988 - current, delayed 1 year(s)
    Annals of Clinical Psychiatry; Dordrecht   Full Text  Full Text: 1999 - 2003
    Annals of Dyslexia; Baltimore   Full Text  Full Text: 1998 - current, some exceptions View details
    The Annual of Psychoanalysis; New York   Full Text  Full Text: 2003 - 2004
    Annual Review of Anthropology; Palo Alto   Full Text  Full Text: 1997 - 2005
    Annual Review of Clinical Psychology; Palo Alto   Full Text  Full Text: 2005 - 2005
    Annual Review of Medicine; Palo Alto   Full Text  Full Text: 1998 - 2005, some exceptions View details
    Annual Review of Neuroscience; Palo Alto   Full Text  Full Text: 1997 - 2005, some exceptions View details
    Annual Review of Pharmacology and Toxicology; Palo Alto   Full Text  Full Text: 1997 - 2005, some exceptions View details
    Annual Review of Physiology; Palo Alto   Full Text  Full Text: 1998 - 2005
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    Annual Review of Sex Research; Mount Vernon   Full Text  Full Text: 1997 - current
    Annual Review of Sociology; Palo Alto   Full Text  Full Text: 1995 - 2005, some exceptions View details
    ANS; Frederick
    Anthropology and Education Quarterly; Washington   Full Text  Full Text: 1999 - current
    Applied H.R.M. Research; Radford   Full Text 
    Applied Linguistics; London   Full Text  Full Text: 1999 - current, delayed 1 year(s)
    Applied Psychological Measurement; Thousand Oaks
    Applied Psychophysiology and Biofeedback; New York   Full Text  Full Text: 1997 - current, delayed 1 year(s)
    Archives de Psychologie; Geneva   Full Text  Full Text: 2006 - current, delayed 3 month(s)
    Archives of Sexual behavīor; New York   Full Text  Full Text: 1992 - current, delayed 1 year(s)
    Archives of Women's Mental Health; Wien   Full Text  Full Text: 2001 - current, delayed 1 year(s)
    Assessment; Odessa
    Audiology; Hamilton   Full Text  Full Text: 1996 - 2001
    Audiology & Neurotology; Basel   Full Text  Full Text: 1998 - current, delayed 1 year(s)
    Augmentative and Alternative Communication; Hamilton   Full Text  Full Text: 1998 - 2001
    The Auk; Washington   Full Text  Full Text: 1997 - current
    Australian Journal of Clinical and Experimental Hypnosis; Heidelberg   Full Text  Full Text: 2005 - 2005
    Australian Journal of Clinical Hypnotherapy and Hypnosis; Brisbane   Full Text  Full Text: 1999 - current
    The Australian Journal of Music Therapy; Turramurra   Full Text  Full Text: 2005 - 2005
    Australian Journal of Psychology; Newcastle   Full Text  Full Text: 2005 - 2005
    Australian Psychologist; Bundoora   Full Text  Full Text: 2005 - 2005
    behavīor and Philosophy; Cambridge   Full Text  Full Text: 1997 - current, some exceptions View details
    behavīor and Social Issues; Cambridge   Full Text  Full Text: 1998 - 1999
    behavīor and Social Issues; Chicago   Full Text  Full Text: 2001 - current
    behavīor Genetics; New York   Full Text  Full Text: 1997 - current, delayed 1 year(s)
    behavīor Modification; Beverly Hills
    behavīoral Disorders; Tempe   Full Text  Full Text: 1997 - current
    behavīoral Ecology; New York   Full Text  Full Text: 1999 - current, delayed 6 month(s)
    behavīoral Medicine; Washington   Full Text  Full Text: 1997 - current
    Behaviour Change; Bowen Hills   Full Text  Full Text: 2000 - current
    Brain; Oxford   Full Text  Full Text: 1994 - current, some exceptions, delayed 1 year(s) View details
    Brain and Mind; Dordrecht   Full Text  Full Text: 2000 - 2003
    Brain Topography; New York   Full Text  Full Text: 1999 - current, delayed 1 year(s)
    Brain, behavīor and Evolution; Basel   Full Text  Full Text: 1998 - current, some exceptions, delayed 1 year(s) View details
    Brief Treatment and Crisis Intervention; Cary   Full Text  Full Text: 2001 - 2005
    The British Journal of Clinical Psychology; Leicester   Full Text  Full Text: 1998 - 2006
    The British Journal of Criminology; London   Full Text  Full Text: 1997 - current, some exceptions, delayed 1 year(s) View details
    The British Journal of Developmental Psychology; Leicester   Full Text  Full Text: 1998 - 2006
    British Journal of Educational Psychology; Leicester   Full Text  Full Text: 1998 - 2006
    The British Journal of Forensic Practice; Brighton   Full Text  Full Text: 2003 - current
    British Journal of Guidance & Counselling; Cambridge   Full Text  Full Text: 1997 - 2000
    British Journal of Health Psychology; Leicester   Full Text  Full Text: 1998 - 2006
    British Journal of Mathematical & Statistical Psychology; Bristol   Full Text  Full Text: 1998 - 2006, some exceptions View details
    British Journal of Psychology; London   Full Text  Full Text: 1995 - 2006
    The British Journal of Social Psychology; Leicester   Full Text  Full Text: 1998 - 2006
    British Journal of Social Work; Oxford   Full Text  Full Text: 1999 - current, delayed 1 year(s)
    British Psychological Society. Proceedings; Leicester
    Bulletin of the Menninger Clinic; New York   Full Text  Full Text: 1998 - current
    The California School Psychologist; Sacramento   Full Text 
    Cambridge Journal of Education; Cambridge   Full Text  Full Text: 1997 - 2000
    Canadian Journal of Behavioural Science; Ottawa   Full Text  Full Text: 1993 - current
    Canadian Journal of Criminology and Criminal Justice; Ottawa   Full Text  Full Text: 1994 - 2006
    Canadian Journal of Education; Toronto   Full Text  Full Text: 1993 - current
    Canadian Journal of Experimental Psychology; Ottawa   Full Text  Full Text: 1993 - current
    The Canadian Journal of Human Sexuality; East York   Full Text  Full Text: 1997 - current
    The Canadian Journal of Occupational Therapy; Ottawa   Full Text  Full Text: 2000 - current
    Canadian Journal of Psychiatry   Full Text  Full Text: 2004 - current
    Canadian Journal of Psychoanalysis; Montréal   Full Text  Full Text: 2006 - current
    Canadian Medical Association. Journal; Ottawa   Full Text  Full Text: 1997 - current
    Canadian Psychology; Ottawa   Full Text  Full Text: 1993 - current
    The Canadian Review of Sociology and Anthropology; Toronto   Full Text  Full Text: 1992 - current
    The Career Development Quarterly; Alexandria   Full Text  Full Text: 1994 - current
    Cerebral Cortex; New York   Full Text  Full Text: 1999 - current, delayed 6 month(s)
    Ceskoslovenska Psychologie; Praha   Full Text  Full Text: 2006 - current
    Chemical Senses; Oxford   Full Text  Full Text: 1999 - current, delayed 6 month(s)
    Child & Adolescent Psychopharmacology News; New York   Full Text  Full Text: 2004 - current
    Child & Adolescent Social Work Journal; New York   Full Text  Full Text: 2005 - current, delayed 1 year(s)
    Child Language Teaching and Therapy; London   Full Text  Full Text: 1998 - current
    Child Maltreatment; Thousand Oaks
    Child Welfare; Washington   Full Text  Full Text: 1994 - current, some exceptions View details
    Childhood; London
    The Cleft Palate - Craniofacial Journal; Hamilton   Full Text  Full Text: 2005 - current, some exceptions, delayed 6 month(s) View details
    Clinical Excellence for Nurse Practitioners; Philadelphia   Full Text  Full Text: 2005 - 2005
    Clinical Nursing Research; Thousand Oaks
    Clinical Pediatrics; Glen Head   Full Text  Full Text: 1998 - 2005
    Clinical Psychology: Science and Practice; New York   Full Text  Full Text: 1999 - current, delayed 6 month(s)
    Clinical Rehabilitation; London   Full Text  Full Text: 1998 - current
    Clinical Social Work Journal; New York   Full Text  Full Text: 1996 - current, delayed 1 year(s)
    Cognitie, Creier, Comportament; Cluj-Napoca   Full Text  Full Text: 2006 - current
    Cognitive, Affective and behavīoral Neuroscience; Austin   Full Text  Full Text: 2004 - current
    College Student Journal; Mobile   Full Text  Full Text: 2002 - current
    Communication Disorders Quarterly; Austin   Full Text  Full Text: 1999 - current
    Communication Education; Annandale
    Communication Monographs; Annandale
    Communication Reports; Salt Lake City   Full Text  Full Text: 1998 - 2005
    Communication Research; Beverly Hills
    Communication Studies; West Lafayette   Full Text  Full Text: 1992 - 2005
  • 心理咨询师的职业病










  • 心理学:不神秘,很可爱






















  • 心理学研究生要读什么样的文献


    2007-04-11 09:50, 迟毓凯











  • 科学家破译猕猴基因组



    作者:张忠霞  日期:2007.04.13  版次:A1-1


        据新华社华盛顿4月12日电  (记者  张忠霞)一个国际科学家小组12日宣布,他们成功破译出了猕猴的基因组,这是继人类和黑猩猩之后,科学家破译出的第三种灵长类动物基因组。13日出版的《科学》杂志将这一成果作为封面文章。





    资料来源:新民晚报 第一版


  • 海的颜色


    海的颜色 发布于2007-04-12 03:57:06






    2。从专业意见来说,早恋孩子的家庭教育往往是有缺陷的,往往是因为没在本该得到温暖的家里,得到孩子所渴望的,才会促使他们很自然的到外面去寻找所需要的,或者是父母关系在孩子身上的连动反应。类似的情况,父母也需要回顾自己所给予的是否就真的是孩子所需要的?多倾听孩子内心深处的呼唤,比自以为是的给予好很多。很多时候, 在孩子成长中没有妥善处理的问题,错过了这个阶段,也许很难再有机会。











  • 5 Mating


    5 Mating

    So far we have explored a number of rather abstractly theoretical issues regarding the evolution and structure of the mind and haven’t paid much attention to the contents of the mind, the specific ways that people think and feel. But what makes Evolutionary Psychology so fascinating is how it applies its abstract theoretical principles to generate specific hypotheses about human psychology. For it holds the promise of revealing the nature of, and evolutionary reasons for, the psychology underlying our intimate relationships with others—why we desire sex with some people but not others, why we marry or cohabitate with the people we do, why we are sometimes unfaithful, why infidelities elicit jealousy, and why we care so deeply for our children. Unlike the more abstractly theoretical issues we have so far considered, these claims concern issues that occupy the overwhelming majority of our daily lives.

    This is the first of three chapters that will examine Evolutionary Psychology’s specific hypotheses, and the evidence offered in their support,regarding the psychology of mate choice, infidelity, jealousy, and parental care. This chapter will focus on the psychology of mate choice.

    Evolutionary Psychology has offered a number of interesting hypotheses regarding sex differences in the psychology of human mating. But this chapter will focus exclusively on two core hypotheses that have become shibboleths of Evolutionary Psychology. Men, Evolutionary Psychologists claim, have an evolved preference for mating with young women, and women have an evolved preference for mating with high-status men. These preferences are supposedly implemented in evolved modules that are also designed to detect signs of youth and status, respectively.

    Evolutionary Psychologists claim to have gathered overwhelming empirical evidence that confirms both of these hypotheses, and this chapter will examine that evidence. Since chapter 4 argued that we don’t have evolved modules for all the functions Evolutionary Psychologists claim, I will not


    be concerned here with evaluating any evidence for modularity. My focus,instead, will be on the preferences themselves—on whether men have evolved to detect and prefer young women and whether women have evolved to detect and prefer high-status men—regardless of the kind of mechanism that implements them. The question is: How good is the evidence for Evolutionary Psychology’s core hypotheses about male and female mate preferences? But before examining the evidence let’s briefly examine the theoretical foundation of the hypotheses.

    “The Evolution of Desire”

    As we saw in chapter 1, life (in the biological, not existential, sense of the term) is all about reproductive success—how many copies of one’s genes one contributes to future generations via the bodies of one’s offspring. We also saw in chapter 1 that many activities have fitness costs and benefits,which respectively diminish and enhance fitness. Producing offspring, the very sine qua non of fitness, is no exception. Indeed, producing offspring is a costly endeavor.

    First of all, barring very recently invented reproductive technologies (which are too new to have affected evolved motives and preferences), in sexually reproducing species such as ours, you’ve got to have sex with a member of the opposite sex in order to produce offspring. But, unfortunately, members of the opposite sex don’t have sex with you just because you want them to. They’ve got to be enticed into it, one way or another,and the cost of enticement can range from the metabolic costs of producing a come-hither wink to the costs of building a bower or obtaining and presenting gifts over an extended period. Once a partner has been enticed,the sex act costs the energy involved in doing it (plus the contents of an ejaculate if you’re male). Then, if sex results in conception and you’re a female, you’ve just begun to pay. If you’re a human female, you pay the costs of a nine-month gestation, which exacts an enormous physiological toll on your body. And, throughout most of our evolutionary history,ancestral women paid the additional metabolic costs involved in breastfeeding for several years.

    So here is one of Nature’s great inequities. If you’re a woman, the absolute minimum cost for producing a single offspring is quite high. Not only do you pay the costs of gestation and lactation, but you also pay the cost of forgoing any other possible reproductive opportunities with males other than the father of your offspring—possibly better males than the father of your offspring—during the period of pregnancy and lactation. If


    you’re a man, on the other hand, the absolute minimum cost for producing a single offspring is the energy expended in copulation and the contents of a single ejaculate (an inexpensive 300 million sperm and three milliliters of semen). After a fruitful copulation, a man can get up and pursue reproductive opportunities with other women, whereas a woman is committed to the costly act of childbearing. This is a radical asymmetry in the minimum costs the sexes must pay in order to produce a single offspring.

    Although the costs are real, it’s not like flushing money down the toilet,since you do get an offspring out of the deal. So these expenditures are really an investment—what is called parental investment. Parental investment is standardly defined as any characteristics or behavīors of a parent that enhance the ability of an offspring to survive and reproduce at a cost to the parent’s fitness, including diminishment in the parent’s future abilities to mate or care for other offspring. Thus, one way of describing the above asymmetry between the sexes is that the minimum obligatory parental investment for women is vastly higher than that for men.

    Evolutionary Psychologists derive their hypotheses about evolved mate preferences from this fact about minimum obligatory parental investment,and the derivation begins in the work of the evolutionary anthropologist Robert Trivers. In a classic article, Trivers argued that, when there is a sex asymmetry in parental investment, selection will tend to make the higherinvesting sex choosier in the mating market, because that sex stands to lose more by making a poor choice of mate. This greater choosiness on the part of the higher-investing sex will force members of the other sex to compete among one another to be chosen. As a result, the higherinvesting sex will appear more cautious in the mating market, while the lower-investing sex will appear more eager and more intensely competitive in its attempts to attract mates. For example, if males invest nothing beyond the act of copulation and an ejaculate, leaving females to cover all costs of parental care, females will be very selective in choosing a mate.Under these circumstances, males are little more than sperm transport, so a male’s quality is solely a function of the genes he can provide. Females will then hold out for males who show signs of having “good genes”—signs such as good health and bodily symmetry (a purported sign of developmental stability). And males will compete among themselves to be chosen by females, attempting to present the best advertisements of “good genes.”

    Trivers’s theory is supported by observations of the mating habits of many species. Some of the strongest support for the theory comes from


    species in which males provide greater parental investment than females,since males in those species tend to be more selective in choosing mates and females are more competitive. But Trivers’s theory also predicts that,if the parental investment in both sexes is relatively high, both sexes will be highly selective in choosing mates, holding out for mates who demonstrate the ability to provide a fairly high level of parental investment.

    Humans are among a small minority of species in which both sexes invest heavily in offspring. Of course, as we’ve seen, the physiological investment by females vastly exceeds that by males. But, as we saw in chapter 1, merely bringing offspring into the world is no guarantee of genetic immortality. In some species, offspring are born sufficiently developed that they can survive on their own almost immediately. But human offspring are heavily dependent on parental care for many years after birth. Indeed, in the early years they are entirely incapable of caring for themselves, requiring very intensive parental care. Since reproductive success requires that offspring themselves survive to reproduce, human offspring need to be nurtured at least until they’re able to survive on their own.

    And this, according to Evolutionary Psychology, is where male parental investment comes in. During our evolutionary history, Evolutionary Psychologists argue, a female who had to spend all her days tending to a suckling infant would not have been able to adequately provide for herself and her infant. So it was necessary for males to provide their mates and offspring with food, shelter, and protection. Further, the demands of survival among our ancestors required learning the skills involved in foraging for food and making shelter, and the demands of reproduction required learning the skills involved in negotiating one’s social group. So males could also enhance the survivability and subsequent reproductive success of their offspring by playing a role in teaching them such skills. On average, then, the rate of survival and subsequent reproductive success of offspring of ancestral “single mothers” would have been lower than that of offspring who enjoyed both maternal care and a high level of male parental care. Thus, Evolutionary Psychologists argue, the extraordinarily heavy dependence of human offspring on parental care created strong selection pressure for a fairly high level of male parental investment. (There are reasons, which I will discuss in chapter 6, for believing that this is not why male parental investment evolved.)

    Despite the relatively high level of male parental investment in our species, however, the postnatal parental investment provided by females still


    our species. With internal fertilization, a female can always be 100 percent certain that the offspring she births are hers. But no male can be 100 percent certain that the offspring birthed by his mate are his. For we are a species in which internal fertilization is coupled with concealed ovulation. This contrasts with other primates, such as chimpanzees. When a chimpanzee female is ovulating, her genitals swell and become red, a clear sign to chimpanzee males that it is time to take action. If a chimpanzee male wants to sire an offspring, he merely needs to ensure that he sexually monopolizes a female during her fertile period. Ancestral human males, in contrast, had no idea when females were ovulating, so they could never be sure whether they were inseminating a fertile female or not. So,in order to sire an offspring, they had to copulate with ancestral females round-the-month. But a lot can happen in a month. The demands of survival would have required frequent periods during which mates were out of one another’s sight foraging, for example. A female who had been out of sight for a mere twenty minutes could have been carrying internally the inseminate of another male. Even if her mate copulated with her immediately upon their reunion, there was never any sure way to know exactly what was going on in there. As a result, any issue from her womb was of uncertain provenance from a male’s perspective. This is known as the problem of paternity uncertainty.

    Given the possibility that a male’s putative offspring are not truly his own, there is always the chance that the male is investing in another male’s offspring, thus squandering resources that could be better spent in a competition to fertilize other females. A female, in contrast, never faces the potential problem of squandering her parental investment on offspring she mistakenly believes to be hers. Thus, Evolutionary Psychologists argue,since human male parental investment can be misspent in a way that human female parental investment cannot, selection should have designed males to deliver a lower level of parental investment than females as a hedge against the possibility of misspending it. In fact, Evolutionary Psychologists further predict, the degree of male parental investment should be a function of the degree to which a male feels confident in his paternity of offspring.

    Nonetheless, because human males provided a fairly high level of parental investment throughout our evolutionary history, they, like human females, have evolved to be very selective in choosing a female with whom they will jointly invest in offspring. However, because the two sexes provided different forms of parental investment throughout human evolutionary history, Evolutionary Psychologists argue, each sex has evolved to prefer as mates those members of the opposite sex who


    show signs of being able to provide the forms of parental investment in which that sex specialized in human evolutionary history.

    As the Evolutionary Psychologists Douglas Kenrick and Richard Keefe put it: “Males invest relatively more indirect resources (food, money,protection, and security), and females invest relatively more direct physiological resources (contributing their own bodily nutrients to the fetus and nursing the child). For this reason, females who are choosing mates are assumed to pay particular attention to a male’s ability to provide indirect resources, and males are assumed to pay special attention to signs of a female’s apparent health and reproductive potential.”1 Thus, females should have evolved to prefer males who can provide indirect resources,whereas males should have evolved to prefer females of peak reproductive

    But this poses a “detection problem” for both sexes: How can each sex detect the members of the opposite sex who possess the preferred qualities?A male’s ability to provide indirect resources cannot be directly detected in the way the length of his nose can. Similarly, as David Buss says: “The number of children a woman is likely to bear in her lifetime is not stamped on her forehead. It is not imbued in her social reputation.Even women themselves lack direct knowledge of their reproductive value.”2 Therefore, Evolutionary Psychologists argue, women should have evolved to be attracted to detectable qualities of men that are correlated with
    the ability to provide indirect resources, and men should have evolved to be attracted to detectable qualities of women that are correlated with peak reproductive potential.

    Women, according to Evolutionary Psychologists, solved their detection problem by evolving a preference for high-status males. For, as the Evolutionary Psychologist Bruce Ellis says: “In general, the higher a male is in status (i.e., the higher the level of esteem and influence accorded to him by others), the greater his ability to control resources across many situations.. . . Since control of positional resources is both a sign and a reward of status, natural selection could be expected to have favored evaluative mechanisms in women designed to detect and prefer high-status men.”3 Hence Evolutionary Psychology’s core hypothesis about female mate preferences.

    Men, on the other hand, needed to solve the problem of detecting peak reproductive potential. Reproductive potential involves two things. On the one hand, it involves fertility, which is a measure of the likelihood of being able to conceive and carry a pregnancy to term, and a human female’s fertility typically peaks in her mid-twenties. On the other hand, reproductive


    potential involves reproductive value, which is a measure of the remaining number of offspring that a female can produce. The younger a fertile woman is the greater is her reproductive potential, since the greater is the number of years she has remaining in which to produce offspring. So women with the highest fertility don’t have the greatest reproductive value and vice versa. But women in their very early twenties are near the peaks of both fertility and reproductive value, so they have the highest overall reproductive potential—that is, the greatest ability to immediately provide the physiological resources necessary for bearing many offspring.

    Of course, as Buss notes, “even age must be inferred, as it cannot be assessed directly.”4 To further complicate matters, this preference for women of peak reproductive potential evolved well before calendars and even before counting, so it wasn’t possible to simply ask about a woman’s age during the evolution of these preferences. Males, Buss argues, also had to evolve a solution to the detection problem for age. Thus, “according to evolutionary psychologists, the evolutionary model predicts that what men desire is not youth per se, but rather features of women that are associated with reproductive value or fertility.”5 These features are “full lips [since lips thin with advancing age], clear skin, smooth skin, clear eyes,lustrous hair, good muscle tone and body fat distribution.”6

    The qualities of full lips, good muscle tone, and so on, are perhaps self-explanatory. But body fat distribution requires some comment. Before puberty, Evolutionary Psychologists argue, boys and girls are shaped much alike, with a waist-to-hip ratio of roughly 0.90 (which means that the girth of the waist is 90 percent of that of the hips). At puberty, however, the release of estrogen in females causes fat to be deposited on the hips and upper thighs. As a result, females’ hips become even wider after puberty, with the waist-to-hip ratio decreasing to around 0.70. Pregnancy,however, often leaves a lasting deposit of fat on the waist, increasing the waist-to-hip ratio. Further, as women approach middle age and undergo menopause, more body fat gets deposited in the waist, thereby further increasing the waist-to-hip ratio. Thus, according to Evolutionary Psychologists,a waist-to-hip ratio of around 0.70 indicates a fertile female who
    has yet to bear a child; and, throughout much of human evolutionary history a fertile, yet childless, female would have been very close to her peak reproductive potential. So, Evolutionary Psychologists conclude, males have evolved a preference for females with waist-to-hip ratios around 0.70.

    We see, then, how Evolutionary Psychologists arrive at the hypotheses that women have an evolved preference for high-status men and that men


    have an evolved preference for young women (that is, women with physical features that are correlated with peak reproductive potential).These hypotheses are derived from general theoretical considerations regarding the nature of parental investment in our species.

    It is worth noting, however, that these preferences are for the qualities of long-term mates. According to Evolutionary Psychologists, when people are in the market for short-term mates (one-night stands, for example),their preferences shift. Men still like fertile women as short-term mates,Evolutionary Psychologists claim, but men’s standards for short-term mating typically drop so low that they’re willing to copulate with pretty much anything that is self-moving (since, after all, sperm is cheap).Women, on the other hand, are less interested in status and more  interested in intelligence and good looks when seeking a short-term mate. In what follows, I will not examine these claims about short-term mate preferences,but will focus exclusively on the two core hypotheses regarding long-term mate preferences.

    Each of the hypotheses about long-term mate preferences is separable into two independent claims. One is a claim about what people prefer, and the other is a claim about why they prefer it. Each hypothesis, that is, contains a claim that a particular universal preference has evolved in each sex and a claim that that universal preference evolved because of selection for it in our evolutionary past (that it is an adaptation). These claims are typically not separated, because empirical studies in Evolutionary Psychology are presumed to test both claims simultaneously.

    To illustrate, consider the male preference for youth. As Buss says,“because male reproductive success in humans depends heavily on mating with reproductively capable females, selection over thousands of generations should favor those males who prefer to mate with reproductively capable females.”7 Here a hypothesis about what males prefer (reproductive capability) is derived from a hypothesis about how selection has acted during human evolutionary history, which would explain why males have that preference (it is an adaptation). If we get confirmation of the derived (preference) hypothesis, it seems to be simultaneous confirmation of the hypothesis (about past selection) from which it was derived. So, if the evidence shows that males indeed prefer youth, that appears to confirm the hypothesis that the preference is an adaptation.

    Universality enters the picture because, for the reasons discussed in chapters 2 and 3, Evolutionary Psychologists believe that adaptations are,of necessity, species universals. This is why, in attempting to confirm hypotheses about evolved mate preferences, Buss conducted a massive


    cross-cultural study (to be discussed below) to determine whether the predicted preferences are indeed universal. According to Buss, the evidence shows that “men universally prefer younger women as wives” and that “women worldwide desire financial resources in a marriage partner.”8 Thus,Evolutionary Psychologists believe that the evidence shows that male preference for young females and female preference for high-status males are adaptations.

    I’ve belabored the distinction between a hypothesis about what people prefer and a hypothesis about why people have those preferences because it helps clarify two different ways in which Evolutionary Psychology’s hypotheses about mate preferences can be questioned. On the one hand, one could ask: How good is the evidence that male preference for youth and female preference for high status are adaptations? That is, how good is the evidence for Evolutionary Psychology’s claims about why people have these preferences? A number of critics of Evolutionary Psychology have asked this question and answered it in the negative, arguing that Evolutionary Psychology falls far short of providing convincing evidence that these preferences are adaptations. Indeed, this is the line of argument that Gould consistently urges against Evolutionary Psychology. According to this line of argument, selection isn’t the only explanation for the existence of these preferences, so merely finding the preferences doesn’t confirm that they are adaptations, since it doesn’t rule out nonadaptationist explanations of the preferences.

    But this line of argument presupposes that Evolutionary Psychologists have provided convincing evidence that males indeed prefer youth and that females indeed prefer high status. So, on the other hand, one could ask: How good is the evidence that males prefer females of peak reproductive potential and females prefer high-status males? That is, how good is the evidence about what people prefer in mates? I believe that this question has not received the attention it deserves, and it will be the focus of the sections to follow. I will argue that there is no convincing evidence for either hypothesized universal mate preference.

    Before turning to these arguments, however, a comment is in order on the notion of universality. We have already discussed some of the complexities of this notion in Evolutionary Psychology, and we have seen that when Evolutionary Psychologists use the term “universal” they are implicitly referring to a developmental program shared by all “normal” human beings, not to manifest or observable preferences, beliefs, attitudes, or behavīors. So, if push came to shove, Evolutionary Psychologists would admit that their claims regarding mate preferences do not mean that


    each and every human male prefers young women and that each and every female prefers high-status men. It is always possible that certain individuals have unusual developmental experiences and end up not possessing the predicted preferences. But, if there is a truly universal developmental program that has been designed by selection to reliably produce a preference for young females in men and a preference for high-status males in women, that developmental program should produce those preferences across a very wide range of conditions. Thus, Evolutionary Psychologists would maintain, to say that those preferences are “universal” means that they are observable in all cultures, all historical periods, all economic or political systems, all social classes, all religious groups, all “races” or ethnicities, and all relevant ages of the life cycle. It is this more restricted sense of “universal”that is operative when Buss claims that female preference for highstatus,resource-holding mates is universal. As Buss says, “women across all continents, all political systems (including socialism and communism), all racial groups, all religious groups, and all systems of mating (from intense polygyny to presumptive monogamy) place more value than men on good
    financial prospects.”9

    I will argue that, even in this more restricted sense of “universal,” the data on human mate preferences fail to provide convincing support for claims of a universal male preference for youth and a universal female preference for high status. Indeed, I will argue, the mate preferences in which Evolutionary Psychologists are interested tend to vary with age and social class, among other things. If this is right, then something is wrong with the hypotheses about human evolution from which Evolutionary Psychology derives its claims about mate preferences. Let’s turn now to the evidence for Evolutionary Psychology’s core mate-preference hypotheses,
    focusing on the studies that are standardly cited in support of those hypotheses.

    Men Seeking Women

    In collaboration with a bevy of social psychologists from around the world,David Buss gathered survey data about mate preferences from 4,601 men and 5,446 women (a total of 10,047 subjects), who comprised thirty-seven survey samples from thirty-three countries located on six continents and five islands. The sheer scale of this study is remarkable, and the study has become an exemplar of empirical research in Evolutionary Psychology.

    Among other things, Buss’s survey asked subjects to give the age at which they’d prefer to marry, and he found that, on average, males preferred to


    marry at 27.49 years of age. He also asked subjects to give the preferred age of their mates relative to their own ages. So males were asked to state how much younger or older than themselves their ideal mate would be.He found that in every one of the thirty-seven samples males indicated a preference for younger mates, with average preferences ranging from 0.38 to 7.38 years younger. Pooling all the samples, Buss found that, on average,males preferred a mate who was 2.66 years younger. “By subtracting the mean age difference preferred between males and their mates (2.66 years)from the age at which males prefer to marry (27.49 years), it can be inferred that males in these samples prefer to marry females who are approximately 24.83 years old. This age preference is closer to peak female fertility than to peak reproductive value.”10

    Without splitting hairs about peak fertility versus peak reproductive value (or peak reproductive potential, which incorporates both), an average preferred age of 24.83 years is clearly near the height of female reproductive potential. Given the large cross-cultural scale of Buss’s study, this appears to show that male preference for females with high reproductive potential is universal. And this, in turn, appears to confirm the hypothesis that selection has designed male mate preferences to be highly sensitive to female reproductive potential.

    As Buss recognizes, however, males may indicate preferences on a survey questionnaire that don’t accord with the actual decisions they make in choosing a mate. In addition, offspring are produced not by preferences for mates with certain qualities, but by actual matings. Consequently,selection cannot have acted on male preferences unless males throughout human evolutionary history actually mated in accordance with their preferences. In particular, a preference for fertile young women could not increase in frequency in a population unless there was a strong correlation between that preference and actually mating with fertile young women.
    Thus, there can’t have been past selection for a male preference for young women unless males with that preference actually produced more offspring,by actually mating with fertile young women, than did males with alternative preferences.

    To confirm that the preferences for young women that males reported on his questionnaire are (and presumably were in our evolutionary history)reflected in actual mating behavīor, Buss compared the age-preference data with the actual ages at marriage of men and women in thirty of his thirtyseven samples. He found that the average age at marriage was 28.2 years for males and 25.3 years for females, only slightly higher than males’ preferred ages of 27.49 years and 24.83 years respectively.


    Of course, it takes two to mate. So, while males may prefer mates who are 24.83 years old, females have their own preferences, and females expressed a preference to marry at 25.4 years to a man of 28.8 years. Thus,the discrepancy between males’ preferred ages of self and spouse at marriage and the actual ages at marriage appears to be a product of compromise with female preference. Indeed, Evolutionary Psychologists argue, we should expect all actual mating decisions and behavīors to differ from the preferences of both sexes, since the preferences of the sexes will typically differ; and, when preferences of the mating parties differ, actual mating
    decisions and behavīors will reflect a compromise between the preferences.Despite the expected compromise, however, the actual average age of women at marriage is very close to the male preference, so male preferences for young women do indeed appear to be reflected in actual mating behavīor. Therefore, Buss concludes, the preference data together with the marriage data provide strong “support for the evolution-based hypothesis that males both prefer and choose females displaying cues to high reproductive capacity.”11

    But Buss’s analyzed data do not clearly confirm this hypothesis. Buss’s analysis of his preference data consists in subtracting the average preferred age difference between male respondents and their female mates (2.66 years) from the average age at which his male respondents said they preferred to marry (27.49 years). Since the average age of his male respondents was 23.49 years, this shows only that young men say that they prefer to marry relatively younger women and to do so at a fairly young age. As Buss recognizes, what males say they want in a mate stands in need of a validity check, which his analysis of his marriage data purportedly provides. But
    Buss’s analysis of his marriage data consists only of comparing the average age of males at marriage (28.2 years) with the average age of females at marriage (25.3 years). While this does show that on average males marry fairly young women, it also shows that on average the males marrying them are themselves young—only 2.9 years older than their brides.

    If males both prefer and choose young women as mates, however, this preference should be present across the male life cycle. Older males should exhibit a preference for young women just as young males do. Since Buss’s analysis employs only the averages from his samples, it doesn’t show that older males prefer and choose young women as mates. The mate preferences of older males disappear into the averages, and the averages present a profile of the mate preferences of relatively young males. But, to confirm that males have an evolved preference for young women, it is not enough to show that young men prefer young women.


    The reason is that there is a large body of sociological evidence that shows the most robust mate-choice phenomenon to be what social scientists call homogamy. Homogamy is the tendency for people to mate with those similar in race or ethnic background, age, socioeconomic status,educational background, and religious orientation. Homogamy is a form of what biologists call assortative mating, which is preferential mating with other organisms with like phenotype(s). In the case of homogamy,mating is assortative with respect to social characteristics rather than
    morphological or behavīoral phenotypes. And a very recent large-scale study of mating in the United States, conducted by the sociologist Edward Laumann and his colleagues, found that similarity in age is even more important in mate choice than similarity in religious orientation.

    But why should age similarity be important in mating? The Evolutionary Psychologists Douglas Kenrick and Richard Keefe argue that there may have been selection for assortative mating by age in our evolutionary past.“Extended interactions over long periods between mates would have been easier if the partners had similar expectations, values, activity levels, and habits. A preference for similarity in age, all else being equal, would have made the long-term cooperation of mates more feasible and thus adaptive.. . . Thus, humans may have evolved with a preference for similar mates,including similarly aged mates, because of the advantage to parenting effort this would have contributed.”12 This simple hypothesis of age homogamy—that human mating is assortative by age—appears sufficient to explain Buss’s finding that young men prefer young women.

    Of course, assortative mating by age doesn’t explain why Buss found a consistent age difference in both his preference data and his marriage data.If people merely seek similarly aged mates, in a very large sample such as Buss’s we should expect the average male preference to be for similarly aged mates (rather than for mates 2.66 years younger) and the average age difference between spouses at marriage to be close to zero (rather than 2.9 years). Why do males consistently prefer and mate with younger women, while women prefer and mate with older men? According to Buss, this age difference reflects the fact that men seek young women as mates, because
    of their reproductive capacity, and women seek older men as mates,because older men tend to have greater resources than younger men. Thus,the consistent age difference between mates appears to tell in favor of the hypothesis that males have an evolved preference for young women and against the hypothesis of age homogamy.

    But, if Buss is right, why should the average age difference be as small as it is? Why shouldn’t twenty-eight-year-old males on average prefer


    twenty-year-old females, who have greater reproductive potential than twenty-five-year-old females? Similarly, why shouldn’t twenty-two-yearold females prefer thirty-five-year-old males, since they tend to have greater resources than twenty-five-year-old males (whom they actually prefer), yet still have a fairly long life ahead of them in which to provide resources for a female and her offspring? Age similarity does seem to be a factor in mate choice. Perhaps some variation on the hypothesis of age homogamy would account for the age difference that Buss found, while providing a better explanation of Buss’s data than the hypothesis that males simply have an evolved preference for young women.

    Consider the following variation on the hypothesis of age homogamy.Let’s begin by supposing that selection favored assortative mating by similar age for the reasons that Kenrick and Keefe suggest (although, in chapter 6, I will present reasons for thinking that this preference was driven by sexual selection rather than natural selection). We need now to explain why, within this general constraint of age similarity, there should be a consistent age difference of just a few years between mates. The zoologist Janet Leonard suggests that this relatively small average age difference between mates is due partly to the fact that human males achieve reproductive maturity later than females. In fact, males lag behind females in reaching puberty and full adult growth by two years, on average. In addition, she argues, because competition among males for mates is slightly greater than competition among females, males require more time than females after reaching physiological maturity to hone their competitive skills and become successful at acquiring mates. This would further increase the age difference between mates. So, if humans paired up strictly as a function of similar age (for the reasons Kenrick and Keefe suggest), but offset similarity in age by sex differences in the achievement of reproductive maturity (for the reasons Leonard suggests), males would be a few years older, on average, than the females with whom they pair. And this corresponds closely with the average age difference Buss found in his marriage data.

    This age difference could be the result of evolution’s having equipped males with a simple preference for females who are a little younger and females with a simple preference for males who are a little older. These preferences could have been adaptive in our evolutionary past by helping to ensure matings between individuals of comparable reproductive maturity at the point in life at which reproduction typically began, which in turn helped ensure extended cooperation in providing parental care.

    Let’s call this alternative hypothesis the hypothesis of adjusted age homogamy. Like Buss’s hypothesis, this hypothesis makes a prediction


    about mate preferences and provides an evolutionary explanation of those preferences. The hypothesis of adjusted age homogamy predicts that males and females both prefer similarly aged mates, but that the preferred ages are adjusted for sex differences in age at reproductive maturation. This entails that males prefer females who are a few years younger than themselves and that females prefer males who are a few years older. This hypothesis thus explains why Buss found that males prefer and mate with females who are a few years younger. More interestingly, however, it also explains why age similarity—albeit adjusted age similarity—would be such a robust effect in human mating.

    We have, then, two hypotheses to consider. One is Evolutionary Psychology’s
    hypothesis that males have an evolved preference for young women because young women have the greatest reproductive potential.The other is the hypothesis of adjusted age homogamy, according to which males have an evolved preference for females who are, on average,a few years younger than themselves. These hypotheses make competing predictions regarding the preferences of forty- or fifty-year-old males.Evolutionary Psychology’s hypothesis predicts that males of all ages should
    prefer—and, when possible, mate with—women in their early twenties.The hypothesis of adjusted age homogamy, on the other hand, predicts that forty-year-old males should prefer women in their late thirties, while fifty-year-old males should prefer women in their late forties. Both hypotheses, however, predict that males in their late twenties should prefer mates in their early midtwenties. Buss’s finding that marriages occur between twenty-eight-year-old males and twenty-five-year-old females, on average, and that this accords closely with the stated preferences of young males, is actually compatible with both hypotheses. Thus, Buss’s findings
    don’t actually confirm Evolutionary Psychology’s hypothesis, since they don’t rule out the competing hypothesis of adjusted age homogamy.But Kenrick and Keefe conducted a study that does appear to show that males do, indeed, have a preference for young women, not simply for slightly younger women. Rather than averaging the ages at marriage of all the subjects in their samples, Kenrick and Keefe examined the average age differences between spouses at marriage for separate age groups—for individuals who married in their teens, twenties, thirties, forties, fifties,and sixties.

    Kenrick and Keefe expected that age similarity would be a large factor in mate choice, for the reasons already discussed, but expected that males would also prefer females of peak reproductive potential. Consequently,they hypothesized that males weigh both age similarity and reproductive


    potential in mate choice, with the result that actual choices of mate strike
    a balance between the two potentially competing considerations.

    This has some interesting implications. For a male in his twenties, like
    Buss’s average respondent, similarly aged females are also those near their
    peak reproductive potential, so males in their twenties should prefer
    females in their early twenties. But, as males age, similarly aged females
    are increasingly further from their peak reproductive potential, so older
    males must trade off the increasingly competing considerations of age
    similarity and reproductive potential. Thus, Kenrick and Keefe predicted,
    “whereas aging males should prefer progressively older women (because of
    similarity), they should also prefer women progressively younger than
    themselves (to maximize reproductive opportunities).”13 That is, as males
    get older, the average age difference at marriage between self and spouse
    should gradually increase. While the age difference at marriage should be
    relatively small for males in their twenties, it should be fairly large for older
    males, who must choose females no older than their forties in order to
    have mates with some remaining, albeit small, reproductive potential.
    Kenrick and Keefe examined all the marriages that took place in Seattle
    in January 1986 and a sample of those in Phoenix in January and May
    1986. To ensure that their results would not simply be an artifact of 1980s
    America, they also examined a sample of one hundred marriages in
    Phoenix in 1923. And to further ensure that these combined results would
    not simply be an artifact of American culture, they examined all marriages
    on the Philippine island of Poro between 1913 and 1939.

    Kenrick and Keefe found the same pattern in all their samples. The 1986
    samples were virtually identical. In these samples, on average, males who
    married in their twenties married females a year or so younger; males in
    their thirties married females a few years younger; males in their forties
    married females about six years younger; males in their fifties married
    females about nine years younger; and males in their sixties married
    females about ten years younger. The sample of Phoenix marriages in 1923
    showed the same pattern for males in their twenties and thirties, but there
    were even greater age differences between older males and their spouses.
    In 1923 Phoenix, males in their forties married females about thirteen
    years younger, and the age difference between spouses increased a year for
    each decade of male age after that. Finally, in Poro, on average, males in
    their twenties married females three years younger; males in their thirties
    married females about nine years younger; males in their forties married
    females about twelve years younger; males in their fifties married females


    fifteen years younger; and males in their sixties married females a full
    twenty years younger.

    Although these data appear to provide straightforward confirmation of
    Kenrick and Keefe’s hypothesis that males weigh both age similarity and
    reproductive potential in selecting a mate, thus striking a balance between
    the two considerations, things are not quite that simple. First, as the
    psychologist Kim Wallen points out, the principal period of fecundity for
    women is between the ages of twenty and forty, and the average age of
    menopause is fifty. But the data show older males, on average, marrying
    women who are past the period of principal fecundity and much older
    males marrying women who are in their postreproductive years or very
    nearly so. If reproductive potential is a significant factor in male mate
    choice at all, regardless of the male’s age we should not find males marrying
    women who are at or very near the end of their reproductive careers.

    Of course, males aren’t the only ones doing the choosing. It may be that
    males in their late fifties and older are unable, for the most part, to attract
    and marry women with significant remaining reproductive potential. So
    the fact that older males marry women with little or no reproductive
    potential could simply be a result of compromise in the mating market.
    Perhaps older men would rather marry significantly younger women, but
    they can’t, so they settle for women who are postmenopausal or very
    nearly so.

    But Kenrick and Keefe also gathered data from personal ads, in which
    advertisers indicated a preferred age or age range for their respondents,
    and the pattern of average preferred age differences from the ads closely
    matched the pattern of average age differences in the marriage data. As the
    age of male advertisers increased, the average age difference between them
    and their desired respondents also increased. However, although men in
    their fifties and sixties did express a preference for much younger women,
    on average, the ages they preferred still fell near the end of or beyond female
    reproductive potential. So, on average, older males not only marry women
    who are postreproductive or nearly so, but seek them as well.

    This is not what we should expect given Kenrick and Keefe’s hypothesis.
    Even if males choose mates by weighing both age similarity and reproductive
    potential, when a potential mate has little or no reproductive
    potential, age similarity should count for little or nothing in mate choice.
    For, by Kenrick and Keefe’s account, age similarity factors into male
    mate choice only because it facilitates extended cooperation in providing
    parental care. But, if a postreproductive mate is chosen, there will be no


    offspring for whom to provide parental care. So a preference for age similarity
    can facilitate parental cooperation only if it plays second fiddle to
    the preference for reproductive potential. However, Kenrick and Keefe’s
    marriage data and preference data appear to show that a preference for age
    similarity among older males virtually trumps any preference for reproductive

    A second problem is that the samples of marriages of males in their fifties
    and sixties consist almost entirely of males who are remarrying, as Kenrick
    and Keefe acknowledge. Evolutionary Psychologists argue that it is enlightening
    to examine the choices that males of those age groups make when they are seeking new mates. But their mating decisions present only a partial picture of the mating decisions of males in those age groups.

    Consider the fact that the National Marriage Project of 2000 found that
    40 to 50 percent of all marriages end in divorce. Suppose we adopt the
    extreme estimate that 50 percent of marriages end in divorce. Some of
    these divorces are attributable to serial marriers (or serial divorcers, depending
    on whether you’re a romantic or not), for whom two out of three, three
    out of four, or even seven out of eight marriages end in divorce. So, even
    if as many as 50 percent of all marriages end in divorce, it is not the case
    that 50 percent of all those who marry end up getting divorced. At least
    50 percent of all men who marry do not get divorced, hence never remarry,
    so about half of all men in their fifties and sixties have decided to remain
    married. Since this half will have married much earlier in life, by Kenrick
    and Keefe’s own data, their wives will be relatively close to their own ages.
    The divorce data, and independent data about the frequency of infidelity,
    however, shows that married people frequently have the option of taking
    up with a new mate. So, these males are making genuine choices to remain
    married, since they always have the option of divorcing and looking for a
    new mate. Remaining married is actually a continual choice of one’s spouse
    over others. Thus, half the older male population is choosing to remain in
    mateships with women who are no longer capable of bearing children. A
    hypothesis about male mate preferences can’t be tested exclusively on the
    males who choose to remarry after fifty. The choices of males who remain
    in mateships with no reproductive potential have to be considered as well.

    Third, Kenrick and Keefe’s analysis of the data suffers from a problem
    that plagues Buss’s analysis as well. They base their analysis entirely on the
    averages in their samples and ignore the variation. But, as Kenrick and Keefe
    admit: “Individual subjects showed wide variation in their preferences,
    however, and in their choice of marriage partners. There were older men
    who sought, and others who married, women their own age.”14


    Kenrick and Keefe don’t report the variation in their data, but the
    evolutionary psychologist Karl Grammer reconstructed the variation from
    their personal-ad data. Grammer found the variation to be much higher
    than one would expect if males prefer mates with high reproductive potential.
    Consider a couple of examples. Among 53-year-old males, preferences
    for mate age ranged from 35 to 57, and among 56-year-old males they
    ranged from 46 to 52. The marriage data undoubtedly exhibit similar
    ranges, although they aren’t reported by Kenrick and Keefe. This means,
    however, that a significant number of males in their fifties and sixties both
    prefer and choose postreproductive women as mates. And this doesn’t
    conform to Kenrick and Keefe’s predictions.

    Apart from these specific problems with Kenrick and Keefe’s hypothesis,
    there is a general reason why it’s problematic to test hypotheses about mate
    preferences against sample averages alone, as both Buss and Kenrick and
    Keefe do. As we saw in chapter 1, variation is not only the fuel on which
    selection burns, but is itself often produced and maintained by selection.
    As a consequence, patterns of variation can be highly significant, because
    they can indicate that different, possibly frequency-dependent, strategies
    are being pursued. To put this another way, Evolutionary Psychologists
    assume that each hypothesis about past selection entails a prediction about
    a single adaptation that evolved in response to it. As a result, Evolutionary
    Psychologists tend to focus only on the sample average to see whether
    it conforms to the phenotypic value they derive from their hypothesis
    about past selection. But hypotheses about past selection can entail the
    coexistence of multiple adaptive phenotypes in a population. In such cases,
    phenotypic values in a population may be bimodally (or trimodally) distributed.
    Such distributions, however, are concealed when only sample
    averages are calculated. So, rather than collapsing variation inside sample
    averages, we should always ask whether there is a potential explanation of
    the variation itself.

    There is not sufficient data at this point to strongly confirm any hypotheses
    about the precise nature and source of variation in male preferences
    regarding age differences between themselves and their mates. But there is
    sufficient data to suggest a possibility. Let’s review a few of the relevant

    First, even if we focus only on the average age differences between males
    and their mates, we find that older males, on average, both prefer and mate
    with females who are very near or at the end of their reproductive careers.
    So, if males are weighing both age similarity and reproductive potential
    in choosing their mates, they are placing too great a weight on age


    similarity if they are still looking to reproduce. Second, when we consider
    the variation in the data, rather than just the averages, we find that many
    older males both prefer and choose postmenopausal females as mates.
    Third, the older males in Kenrick and Keefe’s preference data and marriage
    data are either on the market for mates or remarrying, respectively. This
    group fails to represent that larger portion of older males who have chosen
    to remain in mateships with postreproductive females.

    When these facts are considered together, they seem to call into question
    Evolutionary Psychology’s standard depiction of the mating life of the
    human male. Evolutionary Psychologists typically focus only on the fact
    that a female’s reproductive career is limited by menopause while a male
    can, theoretically, produce offspring well into old age. This focus portrays
    males throughout the life cycle as virile and sexually heroic.

    Although it is, indeed, possible for most males to sire offspring even into
    old age, the fact is that precious few males do sire offspring in old age,
    even in hunter-gatherer populations. A fertility study of the !Kung of the
    Kalahari Desert showed that male fertility peaks at thirty, declines slightly
    to the age of forty, then declines rapidly. Although 25 percent of all individuals
    born survive to age sixty, fifty-year-old males have only about a 3
    percent chance of siring an offspring, and by age fifty-five male fertility
    drops to zero. In addition, a British fertility study of 8,515 couples found
    that males over thirty-five were half as likely as males under twenty-five
    to impregnate their partners within twelve months, even after the study
    controlled for their partners’ age and health. Moreover, male sex drive
    peaks in the twenties, then declines continually throughout the rest of life.
    Accompanying this decline in sex drive is a reduction in the size of the
    testes, a reduction in the volume and force of ejaculation, and a significant
    reduction in the number of motile sperm in an ejaculate. The above
    facts hardly paint a picture of a well-oiled sex machine designed to impregnate
    females even on a deathbed. There is a very real degradation in male
    sexual function beginning in middle age and continuing throughout the
    latter part of the life cycle. Might this change be accompanied by a shift
    in male reproductive effort?

    Reproductive effort refers to the allocation of physiological resources
    among the component demands of survival and reproduction. It is
    expended throughout the life cycle and includes factors such as growth.
    For our purposes, we can consider just the strategic allocation of resources
    between mating effort and parenting effort. Mating effort, of course, is effort
    expended to mate. An organism that mates indiscriminately and invests
    nothing in the spawn of its matings allocates all of its reproductive effort


    to mating effort. In contrast, an organism that mates only until offspring
    are produced, then forgoes any further mating in order to invest itself fully
    in caring for its offspring, allocates part of its reproductive effort to mating
    effort and the majority to parenting effort.

    Parenting effort, recall, is essential to reproductive success. For, if one’s
    children fail to reproduce, one has hit a genetic dead end just as surely as
    if one failed to have children. Reproductive success requires providing care
    and resources for one’s children in an effort to ensure that they in turn
    reproduce. But it’s just as important that one’s grandchildren and greatgrandchildren reproduce as well, for precisely the same reasons. So, wherever selection favors parental investment, it should also, and for the same
    reasons, favor some investment in one’s remoter descendants in an effort
    to help ensure their survival and reproduction. Of course, life is limited,
    and in humans the opportunity to invest in descendants is typically
    limited to grandchildren. Since the lifespan is long enough to overlap with
    the lives of one’s grandchildren, however, there is an opportunity to allocate
    some reproductive effort to grandparenting effort—to caring or providing
    resources for, or aiding one’s children in caring or providing resources
    for, one’s grandchildren.

    The anthropologist Kristen Hawkes and her colleagues have found that,
    through caring and providing resources for their daughters and their
    daughters’ children, grandmothers can promote their reproductive success
    more than if they were to have more offspring themselves. By providing
    care and resources to her daughter and her daughter’s children, a grandmother
    enables her daughter to resume childbearing more quickly than
    she would if she had to care for herself and her children on her own. And
    the number of additional children this enables the daughter to produce
    exceeds the number of children the grandmother would be able to produce
    and successfully care for were she to continue having offspring of her own.
    In other words, even if postmenopausal women could still have children,
    they would nonetheless increase their expected genetic contribution to
    future generations more through grandparenting effort than through continued
    mating effort.

    No one has studied grandfathering to a fraction of the extent that
    Hawkes and her colleagues have studied grandmothering. But the psychologists
    Harald Euler and Barbara Weitzel did a study of grandparental
    investment in Germany. Euler and Weitzel asked adult subjects to indicate
    on a seven-point scale, ranging from 1 (not at all) to 7 (very much), how
    much each of their grandparents had provided care for them up to the age
    of seven years. Euler and Weitzel were primarily interested in whether


    paternity uncertainty affected the degree of grandparental investment.
    They reasoned that the father’s parents should invest less than the mother’s
    parents because of the possibility of mistaken paternity. They also reasoned
    that grandfathers should invest less than grandmothers because of their
    own possibly mistaken paternity of their putative children. As a consequence,
    they claimed, paternal grandfathers should invest the least of all
    due to the possibility of two counts of mistaken paternity. Euler and
    Weitzel did find that maternal grandmothers invested more than maternal
    grandfathers, that paternal grandmothers invested more than paternal
    grandfathers, and that the maternal grandfather invested more than the
    paternal grandmother. These patterns seem to support their hypothesis
    that paternity uncertainty affects grandparental investment.

    What is most interesting for our purposes, however, is their finding that
    grandfathers were rated as significantly investing in their grandchildren.
    The average rating of investment by maternal grandmothers was 5.09,
    whereas the average rating of investment by maternal grandfathers was
    4.51. Similarly, the average rating of investment by paternal grandmothers
    was 4.20, whereas the average rating of investment by paternal grandfathers
    was 3.80. Clearly, grandmothers were more investing than grandfathers.
    However, the difference between grandmothers’ averages and
    grandfathers’ averages is not very large. And this is not simply an artifact
    of grandfathers’ being pressed into service by nagging grandmothers,
    for the average investment rating of widowed grandfathers was still fairly
    high. Widowed maternal grandfathers got an average rating of 4.17,
    and widowed paternal grandfathers got an average rating of 3.89. Thus,
    although grandmothers are clearly more investing than grandfathers, there
    is still evidence of significant grandparenting effort on the part of older
    males, especially on the part of fathers of daughters with children.

    This at least raises the possibility that, like grandmothers, though to a
    lesser extent, grandfathers can enhance their reproductive success through
    grandparenting effort. This could be the case if the rate of return on grandparenting effort exceeded the rate of return on continued mating effort.
    This seems possible given the decline in sexual function in older males and
    the fact that most older males are simply not as attractive as younger men
    to young women (so they cannot compete as successfully for matings with
    young fertile women). So, for most older males, continued mating effort
    would likely not pay. Further, since the rate of return on joint grandparenting
    effort would be greater than that on single grandparenting effort,
    it might pay older males to remain in mateships with their postmenopausal


  • Religious Love at the Interface with Science


     
    Religious Love at the Interface with Science
    Thomas Jay Oord

    This book turns now from scientific studies and the narrative of human altruism to the dialogue among science, religion, and metaphysics.A growing number of scholars are not satisfied with this “either science or love” question.A field of interest and body of work are emerging based on the belief that theories of love, especially religious love, must take into account truths from scientific investigation and speculation in scientific theory. Exactly how scholars involved in this emerging discipline believe love and science should be related and/or integrated varies greatly. What those in this budding field share in common, however, is the belief that issues of love are of paramount importance and that the findings and theories in various scientific disciplines—whether social or natural—must be brought to bear upon how love is understood.

    This annotated bibliography includes a variety of literature either directly related to science-and-love issues or supporting literature for those issues. This listing is by no means exhaustive, for such a list would be endless. Instead, it attempts to be representative of the works available.

    What makes this annotated bibliography unique is that it approaches the love-and-science discussion from the perspective of religion. This means neither that all of the books listed are of a specific religious nature nor that these authors consider themselves religious, although most books and authors do reflect a religious orientation. Rather, these works should be considered especially significant for those who wish to address the love-and-science field from a decidedly religious perspective.

    A cursory glance at the literature reveals that various classical expositions of love continue to influence contemporary scholars. For instance, Plato’s work on eros, especially in his Symposium, provides material with which contemporaries still reckon. The work and words of Jesus Christ, Aristotle, St. Paul, Mo-


    Tzu, Augustine of Hippo, Thomas Aquinas, Guatama, Dionysius, St. Francis of Assisi, Martin Luther, John Wesley, Jonathan Edwards, Sri Ramakrishna, Soren Kierkegaard, and Gandhi also exert influence upon contemporary minds.

    The contemporary discussion of love in the West, however, was initiated by Anders Nygren’s theological arguments in his classic Agape and Eros (1957[1930]). Nygren championed a view heavily influenced by Martin Luther’s theology,and he believed this view to be supported by Christian scrīpture. Prominent among those in the mid-twentieth century who reacted to his arguments were Martin C. D’Arcy, Reinhold Niebuhr, Paul Tillich, and Daniel Day Williams. Today, many scholars proffering a theology of love still engage Nygren’s ideas.

    Nygren and his respondents rarely if ever explicitly addressed how science affects or is affected by the issues of love. Sociologist Pitirim Sorokin is credited with authoring the classic work in the love-and-science discussion. In his midtwentieth century tome, The Ways and Power of Love, Sorokin considers seven aspects of love, including its religious, ethical, ontological, physical, biological,psychological, and social aspects. While the book often cites spiritual and religious figures and ideas, the majority of the author’s interests revolve around love’s psychological and social aspects. In his latter years, Sorokin established the Harvard Research Center for Creative Altruism because of his convictions about the power and importance of love.

    A major issue at the heart of the love-and-science field—and an issue that emerges often in the discussion—is the question of the nature and definition of love itself. Love is, as Mildred Bangs Wynkoop has said, a notoriously ambiguous “weasel word.” “Love” in the English language conveys meanings that other languages employ a variety of words to convey. In addition, when some use “love,” they mean for it to be taken exclusively as an unqualified good. This use derives from Hebrew heritage, and it might be called the “hesed love tradition” (hesed is a Hebrew word often translated “steadfast love”). Others use “love” to refer to either good or bad actions; this usage arises out of what might be called the “virtue and vice love tradition.” In this latter tradition, one adds a qualifier to love such as “proper” or “appropriate” when referring to an unconditional good.

    Not only is the definition of love up for debate, but a great deal of discussion arises about which type of love is best, most appropriate, or most valuable.In this deliberation, three classic Greek words, what might be called the “archetypes of love,” take center stage: agape, eros, and philia.

    Nygren’s claims about the superiority of agape kicked off a modern debate about the meaning and legitimacy of the archetypes. Scholars of the Christian canon have convinced most today, however, that Nygren’s claim to have grounded his agape convictions in scrīpture reflect his own theological orientation to a greater extent than what the biblical text actually supports.Many have











    美国心理学学会  世界最大的心理学专业组织

    心理科学协会(美国心理协会) 世界最大的科学心理学组织

    美国社会与人格心理协会 世界最大的社会与人格心理学组织






    其前身英国咨询协会(British Association for Counselling,简称BAC,1 976年成立)。



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  • 论心理学的理论研究和实证研究


      2005 年8 月      学 术 交 流       Aug. , 2005
    总第137 期 第8 期     Academic Exchange       Serial No. 137  No. 8


    [摘 要]尽管心理学作为一门独立的学科已有百余年的历史,然而,大多数心理学研究者往往只重视一种研究方法,要么重视理论研究,要么重视实证研究,从而导致了心理学的破碎和分裂。其实,这两种研究方式本来是并行不悖、相得益彰的心理学求知通道。理论研究为实证研究提供了理论指导,实证研究为理论研究提供了材料。一切实证研究都是以一定的理论假设为基础,而心理学的理论假设的构建又必须建立在一定的事实基础之上。理论研究与实证研究相辅相成,加强二者的结合,才能使心理学得到全面科学的发展。

    [关键词] 心理学;理论研究;实证研究
    [中图分类号]B84  [文献标识码]A  [文章编号]1000 - 8284 (2005) 08 - 0025 - 03


    尽管理论研究和实证研究在心理学的发展中都具有重要的地位和作用,然而不幸的是,大多数心理学研究者往往只重视一种研究方法,而对另外一种却置之不理。从而导致了心理学的分裂[1 ] 。究竟理论研究和实证研究在心理学的研究和发展中各处于什么位置、作用怎样呢? 本文就这一问题作以具体探讨。


    1. 理论研究的发展

    心理学的理论研究自心理学形成的萌芽阶段就产生了。在哲学心理学时期,心理学的研究者主要由哲学家来扮演,他们采用哲学的研究方法来研究心理学,即用哲学思辨的方法进行心理学的探索。这就是心理学理论研究的开始。随着科学的发展,心理学研究也不断地发展了,科学心理学诞生了。客观地说,科学心理学的研究在很大程度上沿袭了哲学心理学的研究方法(实证主义对心理学产生重大的影响以前) ,如构造主义的建立者冯特的内省法,从本质上讲就是一种理论的研究方法。还有,尽管华生的行为主义心理学主要是实证主义心理学,然而当他建立行为主义的时候,正是通过理论研究的形式提出了行为主义的观点。这样的例子在心理学的发展中举不胜举。显然,心理学史上那些为世公认的奠基人都是伟大的理论家。


    [收稿日期]2005 - 04 - 15
    [作者简介]宋六锁(1962 - ) ,男,河南伊川人,三门峡职业技术学院讲师,在读硕士研究生。

    ·25 ·

    断完善、发展,要求对人类心理做出更高水平的理解。这样,理论心理学就呼之欲出[2 ] 。1967 年,“理论心理学高级研究中心”在加拿大艾伯塔大学成立,标志着理论心理学作为一个独立的研究领域开始恢复它在心理学中的合法地位,也标志着心理学的理论研究终于有了自己的家门。同时,美国著名理论心理学家库克( Koch) 在1959 - 1963 年间主持出版了六卷本的理论心理学巨著《心理学:一门科学的研究》,并在1985 年主编了《一个世纪的心理学》。这两本书使用理论探索的方法,对心理学的科学地位、心理学与其他学科的关系、心理学的方法论和一些具体的理论问题作了深入的理论分析,由此开创了心理学理论研究的新局面。

    2. 理论研究的功能

    由前面论述可知,理论心理学的研究,本质上对心理学的理论研究带来了重大的革命。理论心理学是心理学研究中的重要组成部分,不同的学科也都存在着专门从事理论研究的分支,这些理论学科区别于实验或应用学科,它们不是以观察实验等经验方法研究自然现象,而是以数学演绎和逻辑推理等非经验的思辨的方法探讨问题。事实上这些理论学科成为整个学科发展的基础。理论心理学正是这样的一种学科,它从非经验的角度通过分析、综合、归纳、类比、假设、抽象、演绎或推理等多种理论思维的方式,对心理现象进行探索,对心理学学科本身发展中的一些问题进行反思。实验心理学创立之前的哲学心理学,在某种意义上讲就是一种理论心理学,因为它是以理论思维的方式探讨人的心理现象,并试图从各种具体的心理现象背后发现人的生活的本质。但是,严格地讲,哲学心理学不能称为是理论心理学,因为理论心理学是一门科学,它有自己特定的任务、对象、方法论体系,它是心理学的一个部分而不是心理学的全部,它与实验心理学是并存的。理论心理学非经验的性质并不妨碍它对心理学的贡献。对心理学的作用主要表现为:首先,理论心理学具有提出假设或做出预测为实证心理学提供课题的功能[3 ] 。其次,理论心理学采取的逻辑分析方法,具有判断和鉴别理论真伪的功能,对理论概念的判断和鉴别,并非时时处处需要求助于实验验证,也可以采用逻辑分析的方法去判断理论概念的真伪。最后,它具有抽象和综合功能。它使心理学的概念和理论科学化、概括化。

    3. 理论研究的定位

    心理学理论研究从根本上说来是对心理学元理论的研究。它包含这样一些问题: (1) 心理学的学科问题。包括心理学的学科及研究对象的性质问题,心理学发展中的经验、教训、未来的发展趋势,心理学与哲学、生理学、物理学等自然科学与社会科学的关系,等等。此外,还有心理学研究的社会和伦理意义。(2) 方法论问题。包括心理学研究的指导思想、方法的选择、理论评价的标准、科学哲学对心理学的影响等。(3) 心理学的基本框架。包括心理学现象的分类、各学科的内在联系,沟通不同分支学科、不同心理学现象、不同理论学派之间的重大概念及框架,等等。这是最重要的问题。“心理学只有获得了紧凑的、经济的、相互关联的和一致性的知识才能被看作是一门真正的科学”[4 ] 。实体理论不同于元理论,在于它的研究对象不是心理现象或心理科学的整体,而是一些特殊的和具体的心理现象及问题。如果说,元理论的探讨主要依赖于抽象和思辨的方法,那么,实体理论的探讨则更多地依赖于逻辑推理和数学演绎的方法。


    1. 实证研究的发展

    心理学实证研究的方法,是随着哲学方法论的发展而发展的。为了追求心理学的自然科学研究模式,迅速提高其科学性,心理学从诞生之日起就以实证主义作为其方法论。在19 世纪中叶,法国哲学家孔德首创了实证主义的科学哲学。孔德继承了17 世纪以来欧洲哲学中经验主义传统,特别是贝克莱、休馍的主观经验论和牛顿的机械论哲学,他认为经验是科学知识的唯一来源,一切知识都必须建立在经验证实的基础上。行为主义心理学家华生就接受了孔德实证主义的观点,明确主张心理学是纯粹的自然科学的一个客观分支,认为心理学应该以严格的实验法和策略对行为进行研究,反对研究心理学的内部机制。马赫接受并改造了孔德的实证主义,他把实证哲学的问题归结为经验的明晰确证问题,认为实证论是一种认识论,是以澄清科学命题为己任,把科学的任务看作是对事实的概要性描述而非理解和解

    ·26 ·


    2. 实证研究的功能和定位

    实证主义对心理学的影响主要通过两条方法论原则:一是经验证实原则,即强调任何概念和理论都必须以可观察的事实为基础,能为经验所验证,超出经验范围的任何理论和概念都是非科学的。二是客观主义,强调认知过程中主体和客体的分离,主体的认知应该绝对反映客观事物的特点,不掺杂个人态度、情感、信念和价值等主观因素[5 ] 。通过运用这两条原则,我们发现心理学的实证研究的本质是对心理学的实体理论进行了探讨。在研究过程中主要研究两方面的内容:一是一般的理论,比如心理学中的混沌理论、系统理论、人工智能理论、心理过程中的心理论、项目反应理论、决定论、意识论,等等;二是具体理论,如感觉知觉理论、学习理论、情绪理论、人格理论、能力理论、创造理论,等等。这类理论有个共同点,就是理论思维同实证研究是结合的,即从其他的实证学科中获取数据和资料,从中抽象出一般的性质。例如,在当代,大部分认知心理学家把注意的中心指向认知过程的实证分析上,以计算机模拟的方式分析认知过程,从而得出人的内部心理机制。总之,实证研究从微观上对心理现象进行了全方位的研究和探讨,在心理学的发展中具有重要的功能和作用。




    [参 考 文 献]

    [ 1 ]  叶浩生. 再论心理学的分裂与整合[J ] . 心理学探新,2000 , (2) .
    [ 2 ]  叶浩生. 论理论心理学的概念、性质与作用[J ] . 湖南师范大学学报,2003 , (5) .
    [ 3 ]  叶浩生. 实证主义的衰落与理论心理学的复兴[J ] . 南京师范大学学报(社会科学版) ,1998 , (1) .
    [ 4 ]  霍涌泉,安伯欣. 西方心理学的复兴及其面临的挑战[J ] . 陕西师范大学学报(哲学社会科学版) ,2002 , (6) .
    [ 5 ]  谢国栋. 实验心理学的反思[J ] . 河南师范大学学报,2002 , (4) .


    ·27 ·



    Psychology: A SAGE Full-Text Collection

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  • suicide and cancer



    作者:  日期:2007.03.29  版次:A1-11















        ■经济负担重不愿拖垮家庭  “家里穷治病已经花光了钱还欠很多债,这些患者心理压力都很大,觉得连累了家人尤其是子女。”因为保安队长都必须与死者家属接触而了解其死亡原因,而众多家属也都会首先猜测患者是考虑家庭经济负担而选择自杀。“这是很现实的因素,有一位60多岁的阿婆,住院多次,一天子女在病床前因为经济原因当面争吵,当天晚上,阿婆就跳楼了。”广州市荔湾区某三甲医院一位肿瘤科医生沉痛地告诉记者,经济因素虽然现实,但绝对是占第一位的主导因素。

        ■疗效欠佳,痛苦不堪,一死求解脱  据一名姓贾的医生(化名)告诉记者,他曾收治过一位肝癌病人,由于住院时已全身多处骨转移,大量腹水,痛苦不堪,于是偷偷选择了自杀了事。

        ■心理脆弱,认为癌症是绝症,不如早点死算了  “国人恐癌心理特别强,国外没有医生、家属会瞒着病人不告诉其患癌,但在国内则很多家属央求医生怎么也不能告诉病人患癌,这证明无论是患者还是家属对癌症的承受度比较弱。”有医生告诉记者。

        ■缺乏家庭温暖,厌生求死  一位临床肿瘤科医生告诉记者:“有的亲属本来与病人好像感情很‘深厚’,一旦得知病人时日不多就立刻变脸,轻者玩消失,重者摆明认钱不认人。我还听到过他们讨论分遗产!”







  • psychological term



    人格五因子模型定式问卷 1*


    Structured diagnostic interviews 定式诊断晤谈 

    为针对诊断标准手册中的诊断标准设计的一组晤谈问卷,对所有的受检者使用同一种问卷并以同样的程序进行检查目前已有许多定式诊断晤谈用于评估儿童、青少年的内向化和外向化障碍。 1*476


    psychobabble 心理呓语<美口>



    psychodrama 心理表演疗法/心理剧



    Single Category Implicit Association Test


    The Single Category Implicit Association Test (SC-IAT) is a modification of the Implicit Association Test that measures the strength of evaluative associations with a single attitude object


    Andrew Karpinski and Ross B. Steinman, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology Copyright 2006 by the American Psychological Association 2006, Vol. 91, No. 1, 16–32



  • Confidence of paternity, divorce, and investment in children by Albuquerque men


    Confidence of paternity, divorce, and investment in children by Albuquerque men
    Kermyt G. Andersona,4, Hillard Kaplanb, Jane B. Lancasterb
    Department of Anthropology, University of Oklahoma, Norman, OK 73019, USA
    Human Evolutionary Ecology Program, Department of Anthropology, University of New Mexico, Albuquerque, NM 87131, USA
    Initial receipt 22 May 2006; final revision received 6 June 2006

    1. Introduction

    Asymmetry of parental investment is a fundamental feature of sexual reproduction (e.g., Clutton-Brock, 1991;Low, 2000). In the vast majority of species, female gametes are larger than male gametes and provide the initial energy plant for development. Moreover, when investment extends beyond the initial energetic input into gametes, it is often the female that provides the extra care or resources. In some cases, however, males do provide substantial inputs into offspring, rarely more than females but sometimes as much as females. Therefore, paternal care is much more variable across species than maternal care. While among birds and mammals, most females engage in extensive parental investment, male care of offspring is rather rare among mammals, common in birds, and highly variable among fish (Clutton-Brock, 1991). Because parental care is costly,evolution predicts that males will provide less parental investment for putative genetic offspring who are unlikely to be their actual offspring (e.g., Alexander, 1974; Trivers,1972; Xia, 1992).

    The distinctions between actual paternity, nonpaternity,and paternity confidence are often confounded or overlooked in the literature (Anderson, Kaplan, & Lancaster, in press; Schwagmeyer & Mock, 1993). Paternity refers to the actual likelihood that a man is (or is not) the biological father of a particular child. Nonpaternity is the exclusion of paternity and refers to the likelihood that a man is not the genetic father of a particular child. Modern paternity tests do not prove paternity; rather, they demonstrate nonpaternity by showing that a given man is exceedingly unlikely to have fathered a particular child. In contrast, paternity confidence refers to a man’s internal (not necessarily conscious or articulated) assessment of his paternity.

    Among humans, beliefs about paternity and men’s responsibility for children vary greatly cross-culturally (e.g., Beckerman et al., 1998; Hrdy, 2000; Levine, 1987),


    though men in many different cultures pay great attention to paternity (e.g., Betzig, 1989; Daly & Wilson, 1988). In Western legal tradition, men are generally not held responsible for putative children who are in fact not theirs (Rudavsky, 1999; Wilson, 1987), and American men who refuse to pay child support often cite suspected nonpaternity as justification (Dubey, 1995).


    The mechanics of internal fertilization and live birth mean that while women are always sure of maternity, men can never be fully positive of paternity. Men must rely instead on indirect cues such as mate fidelity or child resemblance to assess whether they are likely to be the father of a particular child (e.g., Davis & Daly, 1997). Most research on paternity confidence has focused on men’s resemblance to children and their ability to detect it (reviewed in Anderson et al., in press). In contrast,Anderson et al. (in press) examined demographic correlates of paternity confidence, using data on men in Albuquerque,NM. They reported that men were more likely to report low paternity confidence in a pregnancy if the man was not married to the child’s mother or if the pregnancy was unplanned. Both of these factors are likely to correlate to some extent with the potential for mate infidelity. No research has directly examined how accurately men assess paternity confidence, though indirect evidence suggests that men with high paternity confidence may be more accurate in their assessment than men with low paternity confidence (Anderson, 2006).


    The prediction that males will invest less in offspring who are unlikely to be theirs has received limited empirical examination. For avian species, the prediction is generally met, although the effect is not as strong or as universal as originally predicted (Mbller & Birkhead, 1993; Schwagmeyer et al., 1999; Whittingham & Dunn, 2001), and many of the avian studies have been criticized on methodological

    grounds (Kempenaers & Sheldon, 1997; Schwagmeyer & Mock, 1993; Sheldon, 2002). Among nonhuman primates, it has been questioned whether paternal care ever reflects paternity (e.g., Van Schaik & Paul, 1996).


    Among humans, analyses of qualitative cross-cultural data suggest that paternity confidence is positively associated with men’s involvement with children, or with investment or inheritance from paternal kin (Diamond & Lorcay, 1989; Flinn, 1981; Gaulin & Schlegel, 1980; Greene, 1979;

    Hartung, 1985; Kurland, 1979). Within societies, greater investment by matrilineal than patrilineal kin suggests significant levels of nonpaternity, or more precisely, it suggests reduced levels of paternity confidence (Euler &

    Weitzel, 1996; Gaulin, McBurney, & Brakeman-Wartell,1997; McBurney, Simon, Gaulin, & Geliebter, 2002; but see Pashos, 2000, for mixed results). Relatively, little is known about the rates of actual paternity cross-culturally (see Anderson, 2006, for a detailed analysis).Fox and Bruce (2001) used a sample of men in Knoxville County, TN, to examine the relationship between confidence of paternity and (a) a measure of men’s affective involvement with children, and (b) a composite fathering variable. They found a positive relationship for both outcomes, but paternity confidence was unrelated to several

    other measures of fathering (responsivity, harshness, and behavīoral engagement). However, Fox and Bruce (2001) provided no substantive information on how they measured paternity confidence, making the interpretation and contextualization of their results difficult.


    No study has directly examined the quantitative relationship between actual paternity and investment in or involvement with children. In the current study, we propose to examine how self-reported paternity confidence influences men’s investment in their putative genetic offspring. We analyze how paternity confidence influences paternal investment indirectly, through the likelihood that men may abandon low paternity confidence children, and directly,through reduced direct male involvement with low paternity

    confidence children after controlling for divorce status.


    1.1.   Hypotheses


    We proposed two routes through which low paternity confidence may reduce paternal investment. One route is through divorce or separation from the child’s mother,which often results in men ceasing to live with the child. In many cultures, divorce results in reduced male investment in children from previous relationships (e.g., Amato, 1987;Anderson, Kaplan, Lam, & Lancaster, 1999; nderson,Kaplan, & Lancaster, 1999; Hofferth & Anderson, 2003;Simpson, 1997; Teachman, 1991; Weiss & Willis, 1985;Weiss & Willis, 1993). This reduction in investment  occurs in part not only because of reduced contact between men and children, but also because men have reallocated resources toward new avenues of mating effort, as well as perhaps into new children or stepchildren (Anderson, 2000).Divorce can be considered an indirect form of reduced investment in children and results in our first hypothesis:(1) Men will be more likely to divorce women if they suspect or are sure that they are not the father of their partner’s child.


    Whether or not divorce has occurred, men may reduce direct investment in low paternity confidence children.Controlling for paternal coresidence in this analysis is crucial. We expected to find an effect of paternity confidence on men’s investments in children, above and beyond the effects of divorce on investment. This led to our second hypothesis: (2) Controlling for divorce, men will reduce direct investments in low paternity confidence children relative to high paternity confidence children.


    2.        Methods


    We used self-reported data from the Albuquerque men data set, a sample of men living in Albuquerque, NM,collected between 1990 and 1993 (see Kaplan, Lancaster, & Anderson, 1998, for further details). Participants were recruited at the Bernalillo County (New Mexico) Motor